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This paper is aimed to assess, with two lab experiments, to what extent KĘ￿szegi and Rabin's (2006)
model of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences can explain Knetsch's (1989) endowment
effect. Departing from past work, we design an experiment that treats the two goods (a mug and a
pen) symmetrically in all but in the probabilities with which they are expected to be owned. Thus,RXU
"endowmentless" endowment effect experiment shuts down all alternative mechanisms while leaving
expectations the only difference between treatments. We find no evidence that expectations alone













A substantial body of experimental evidence has accumulated since Knetsch's (1989) rst
`endowment eect' demonstration, where most subjects chose to keep a randomly-assigned
owned object rather than trade it for another.1 While numerous subsequent studies repli-
cate the original result, recent ndings show that the eect may shrink or disappear among
market-experienced subjects (List, 2004), among lab subjects who are trained to trade (En-
gelmann and Hollard, 2010), or under specic experimental procedures (Plott and Zeiler,
2007).
This large and growing body of experimental evidence is interpreted dierently by dif-
ferent observers. In one common interpretation, the eect is seen as evidence of loss aver-
sion, and experiments where it is found are seen as supporting Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). According
to prospect theory, an individual evaluates economic outcomes by comparing them with a ref-
erence point (for example, comparing potential consumption bundles with a currently owned
one), and by weighing losses (relative to said reference point) more heavily than gains.2 Un-
der this view, experiments where the eect is not found are seen either as instances that
lie outside the domain where prospect theory is expected to hold, or as instances where
ownership is not suciently emphasized to subjects|or is not expected by subjects (e.g.
experienced traders) to last|and hence where a reference point is not properly established.
On the other hand, according to a competing interpretation, all ndings to date are
largely consistent with neoclassical (reference-independent) preferences. Holders of this view
interpret the many replications of the eect as resulting from incomplete information, uncer-
tainty, or ambiguity regarding the objects, context, and other factors that may aect costs
1The term `endowment eect' was coined by Thaler (1980), who predicted that a good's value to an
individual would increase once it became part of her endowment.
2These are not the only components of prospect theory. The theory also assumes, e.g., that utility
is concave in gains and convex in losses, and that individuals weight probabilities. However, these other
components of the theory are not necessary for predicting the endowment eect, and have typically not been
discussed in its context.
2and benets as perceived by subjects. Finally, a third alternative views some ndings as
consistent with prospect theory and others as consistent with standard theory. According
to this view, each theory predicts behavior under a dierent set of circumstances.
That the same body of evidence coexists with dierent interpretations is far from sur-
prising. But a disagreement regarding interpretation is less likely to last when virtually all
the relevant evidence comes from experiments that are relatively straightforward to repli-
cate, tweak, and rene, and when the main competing theories make predictions that are so
dierent. According to prospect theory, economic behavior depends on a reference point; ac-
cording to neoclassical theory, it does not. What could have prevented experimentalists from
designing variations of the original experiment to convincingly test between the theories?
One answer is that for a long time, a clean test was impossible to devise because, as sug-
gested above, prospect theory is practically unfalsiable unless it species how the reference
point is determined. Without an explicit theory that would state which components in past
experiments are crucial for establishing the reference point and which components can|and,
to prevent neoclassical theory from explaining the eect, should|be left out, both theories
can accommodate a wide range of ndings.
Fortunately, this situation has been changing recently, with new theoretical developments
that open the door for such tests. One example is K} oszegi and Rabin's (2006) (henceforth
KR) model of reference-dependent preferences, which seems to be increasingly recognized as
the gold standard in the literature. KR propose a formal theory of reference-point deter-
mination: it is determined by expectations|\a person's reference point is the probabilistic
beliefs she held in the recent past about outcomes." Furthermore, by combining their model
with a specic theory of expectations formation|requiring expectations to be rational, and
requiring individuals to select those (rational) expectations that maximize expected utility|
KR put enough structure to render the theory substantially more falsiable. And although,
as they repeatedly note, what is meant by \recent past" is still open for interpretation, their
combined model makes specic (and hence, testable) predictions.
3The goal of our paper is to assess, with two lab experiments, to what extent KR's model
of reference-dependent preferences can explain Knetsch's (1989) ndings. For this purpose,
we design a version of the original experiment where instead of endowing individuals with a
good and then surprising them with an oer to trade it for another, we replace endowment
with expectations|in the form of clear and reliable probabilistic information regarding the
possibilities and choices subjects will face during the entire experiment|and we replace
surprise with a realization of one of these expected possibilities. Furthermore, our design is
such that it is not subject to any of the confounds suggested in the literature in the past,
such as various transaction costs, informational confounds, and demand eects (Plott and
Zeiler, 2007); or \trade uncertainty" (Engelmann and Hollard, 2010).
In our rst experiment, we present 102 subjects with two goods (a mug and a pen) and
ask them to toss a coin which, as the subjects consequently learn, determines which of the
two goods is \assigned" to them. What \assigned" means diers by treatment. In our Weak
Reference treatment, subjects will get the assigned item as a gift with 1% probability, and
with 99% probability they will be able to choose which of the two items will be their gift.
In our Strong Reference treatment, these probabilities are reversed: subjects will get the
assigned object with 99% probability, and with 1% probability they will be able to choose
their gift. We use a quiz to verify that subjects fully understand these probabilities and,
hence, that they form expectations as intended by our treatments. Importantly, endowment
is entirely absent from our experiment, and is fully replaced by these expectations.
In our second experiment (with 434 subjects) we add a dimension to our rst experi-
ment whereby we also examine to what extent the very experimental procedures we use for
establishing subjects' expectations regarding their outcomes may act dierently on subjects
whose own outcomes are, by design, not aected by these procedures. Specically, a subset
of our subjects go through the coin-toss, instructions, and quiz while knowing all along that
these procedures aect others, but not them. Hence our second experiment takes a further
step in disentangling expectations not only from endowment, but also from the procedures
4we use for controlling expectations in the lab.
To the extent that endowment aects outcomes through establishing expectations (re-
garding outcomes), by removing endowment and instead directly establishing expectations
one should be able to replicate the eect, at least partially. This has indeed been suggested
by recent experimental work (Knetsch and Wong, 2009; Ericson and Fuster, 2010).3 By
shutting o all previously-oered alternative explanations and potential mechanisms other
than the expectations channel, we thus ask: How much of the endowment eect can be ex-
plained as an expectations-based reference eect  a la KR, and how much of it requires other
explanations like endowment, experimental procedures, etc.?4
The answer that emerges from our two experiments is that we nd virtually no evidence
that expectations alone|without actual endowment|can reproduce any part of the original
eect. Specically, in our rst experiment we nd that while subjects are more likely to
choose the good assigned to them by the coin-ip, they are not more likely to do so in
the Strong Reference treatment than in the Weak Reference treatment, and hence their
behavior cannot be explained by expectations. In our second experiment, despite having a
large subject pool, the only dierences in choices we nd across coin-ips and experimental
treatments are small, often far from statistically signicant, and often with the opposite sign
of KR's predictions. These ndings are especially important given the size of the original
eect. In Knetsch's (1989) experiment, once subjects are endowed with a good (either a mug
or a chocolate bar), they are at least eight times more likely to keep it than to trade it for
the alternative good. This result has been replicated many times, often with similarly large
dierence in proportions (see, e.g., List, 2004).
Our ndings should hold import for academics as well as for policymakers. For economists,
3We discuss this work in the next section.
4As suggested above, KR's model consists of three components: (a) prospect theory's value function; (b)
a reference point that is determined by expectations; and (c) a theory of rational expectations. KR note
that the last component|the assumption that the expectations that determine the reference point are \fully
rational" (in a sense spelled out in their model)|could be replaced by \any theory of how these expectations
are formed. But as a disciplined and largely realistic rst pass," KR \assume that expectations are fully
rational." Notice that the present paper is not aimed at asking to what extent the dierent components of
KR's theory explain the endowment eect, but rather to what extent the combined theory explains it.
5determining why preferences are so often found to depend on initial endowments merits se-
rious eort. If part of the explanation is that preferences are dened not only over absolute
outcomes but also over the dierences between outcomes and an expectations-based refer-
ence point, then a re-evaluation of our modeling assumptions is necessary, e.g. regarding
how expectations relate to the basic independence assumption. At the same time, if expec-
tations alone cannot explain the endowment eect, then one would want a general theory to
specify what it is about actual ownership|or, at least, about actual ownership as it is often
implemented in lab experiments|that seems to change preferences so dramatically. For
policymakers, resolving this issue is invaluable for cost-benet analysis and, more generally,
for any computation involving welfare analysis.
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses recent relevant
work and provides the general theoretical framework that motivates the design of our rst
experiment. Section 3 presents the results from our rst experiment. Section 4 describes the
design and results of our second experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Testing for a Reference Eect
In this section we briey outline a simple version of KR's model, describe our rst experi-
ment, and solve the model in the context of our experiment. Before doing so, we place our
experiment (and its ndings as described above) in the context of two recent related studies.
2.1 Endowment, Reference, and Expectations
Of the related literature, the paper that is closest to ours is Ericson and Fuster (2010).
In independent work, they demonstrate the potential of KR to explain at least some of
Knetsch's (1989) original eect. In contrast to our work, however, they do not attempt to
ask how much of the (very large) original eect can in fact be attributed to KR. And while
they nd that expectations could explain some of the eect, we nd no evidence that they
6do.
Ericson and Fuster endow 45 subjects with a mug, and ip a coin to determine the
probability with which subjects will be allowed to trade it later for a pen; the probability
can be either 10% (a strong reference treatment) or 90% (a weak reference treatment). They
nd that 77% and 44% of mug owners, respectively, choose to keep the mug in the two
treatments. On the other hand, they nd the opposite result|38% and 71%, respectively,
choose to keep the mug|when instead of ipping a coin in the presence of subjects they
randomly assign 63 subjects to one of the two treatments in a manner not transparent to the
subjects. As they observe, while the latter design is confounded along the lines suggested by
Plott and Zeiler (2007)|the probability with which a subject is allowed to trade the mug
may itself be perceived by subjects as conveying information regarding the mug's value|the
latter result is also informative regarding the relative strength of the expectations channel as
a potential driver of the eect. Overall, their ndings above may suggest that once a good
is endowed, information (or value signals) and expectations interact in a way that gives
expectations an important role in setups where value signals are absent but a lesser role
where they are present; while our ndings|which are not subject to the above confound|
may suggest that when endowment itself is entirely absent, the role of expectations alone is
reduced even when value signals are absent as well.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper and the concurrent work of Ericson and Fuster
are the rst direct tests of predictions of a fully-specied version of prospect theory in
the context of Knetsch's (1989) original experiment.5 However, we are not the rst to
run endowment eect experiments that are motivated by KR's theory. Knetsch and Wong
(2009) demonstrate that ownership and endowment may not be the only|or even the main|
drivers of the eect, and propose that the eect should hence be renamed a `reference eect.'
They hypothesize that the eect is triggered by endowment and ownership only in contexts
5Recent work tests KR's model in contexts other than Knetsch's (1989) original experiment. For example,
Abeler et al. (forthcoming) test the model's predictions for eort provision. See also Smith (2008), who tests
for a WTP-WTA gap, and Ericson and Fuster's (2010) WTA experiment.
7where|and only to the extent that|endowment and ownership happen to inuence subjects'
expectations, and they present evidence that is consistent with this interpretation. However,
since they do not explicitly control (or verify) expectations, interpreting their experiments in
light of KR requires speculation similar to the speculation that is required when interpreting
the original experiment and many of its variants. In contrast, our experiments directly
control expectations by fully informing subjects, right from the outset, regarding both exact
experimental procedures and complete probability distributions over the choice sets they
might face. By systematically varying these probability distributions and hence|according
to KR|the reference point, we can directly test to what extent the endowment eect is a
reference eect.
2.2 The General KR Framework
In KR's model, a consumer's utility depends not only on her K-dimensional consumption







(mk (ck)   mk (rk)),
consists of two components, both separable across dimensions. The rst, \consumption util-
ity," corresponds to standard, `classic,' utility. The second, \gain-loss utility," corresponds
to prospect theory's reference-dependent utility. The value function  satises (x) = x for
x > 0, and (x) = x for x  0. The parameter  > 0 is the weight an individual attaches
to gain-loss utility, and  > 1 is her \coecient of loss-aversion." Hence  is a measure of
prospect theory's famous \kink": the pain from a(n arbitrarily small) loss is greater than
the pleasure from a gain of equal size. The model allows for both c and r to be stochastic,
and assumes that individuals maximize expected utility.
As noted above, in KR's version of prospect theory, the reference vector r results from
expectations. \Specically, a person's reference point is her probabilistic beliefs about the
8relevant consumption outcome held between the time she rst focused on the decision de-
termining the outcome and shortly before consumption occurs" (K} oszegi and Rabin, 2006).
The reference r is determined endogenously, as what KR term a preferred personal equi-
librium (PPE). A PPE is a probability distribution over consumption outcomes that satises
the following two conditions. First, it is a personal equilibrium (PE), which is a rational ex-
pectations equilibrium in the following sense. Given a consumer's expectations regarding the
state of the world|represented by a probability distribution over choice sets|she forms ex-
pectations regarding choice outcomes|a probability distribution over consumption vectors.
These expectations over outcomes are rational in that they are consistent: a consumer who
holds them as her reference will indeed nd that following through (by making the ex ante
expected choices) maximizes her utility.
Second, a PPE is a preferred PE: when more than one PE exists, a PPE is the one
that maximizes ex ante expected utility. In other words, when the consumer can form more
than one set of expectations regarding outcomes which, once her reference, is consistent with
optimal choices ex post|she will choose as her reference point the ex ante preferred one.
For a formal exposition and a detailed discussion see K} oszegi and Rabin (2006).
2.3 Application: The Reference Eect
We now apply KR's model to our rst experiment. The main contribution of our experiment
is that it directly manipulates a subject's expectations regarding the choice sets she will face.
We do this by directly and explicitly informing her about the relevant probabilities. With
no ambiguity regarding her expectations|which we verify with a quiz (see below)|we can
solve the model and derive testable predictions.
2.3.1 Experiment 1: Design
Our rst experiment involves two consumption goods, a mug and a pen, which we denote
below ci and cj. It is conducted at a large university in the Midwest. Each experimental
9subject is seated at a table, on which the two goods are located, along with a set of printed
instructions, a printed survey, a coin, an envelope, and something to write with (for a photo of
the experimental setup and for an example of the experimental instructions see Appendix A).
On the rst page of the instructions subjects are asked to ip a coin and to choose a
number between 1 and 100. The experimental procedure is explained on the second page,
which subjects are allowed to see only after they marked down on the rst page both their
coin-ip outcome and their choice of a number. In our Strong Reference treatment, the
second page opens with the text:
In front of you are two items. You will get one of them as a gift to take home. Whether
or not you can choose your gift is determined at random, as explained below in detail.
In brief, there is a 1% probability that you will be able to choose which item you take
home. However, there is a 99% probability that you will NOT be able to choose, and
that your gift will automatically be the pen if you ipped \heads" and automatically
be the mug if you ipped \tails."
Feel free to inspect the items but please return them both to their places before we
continue.
The text in our complementary Weak Reference treatment is identical, but \1%" above is
replaced with \99%," and \99%" above is replaced with \1%." The rest of the second page
of the instructions explains the experimental protocol in detail, including explaining how
the 1% vs. 99% randomization will be carried out (the sealed envelope next to the subject
contains a number between 1 and 100, which has a 1% probability of matching the number the
subject wrote on the rst instructions page). In addition, the explanation above regarding
probabilities is repeated, using alternative|and perhaps more intuitive|descriptions. For
example, in the Strong Reference treatment:
Notice that you have a 1% chance (or 1/100) to be able to choose your gift at the end
of the survey. In other words, there is a very high probability that you will take home
the gift determined by the coin-ip, regardless of which gift you choose.
10Subjects are then asked if they have questions. After any questions are answered by the
experimenter, they proceed to the third page, which includes two quiz questions to verify
that they indeed understood the instructions and formed correct expectations regarding the
probabilities of future consumption of either good given their expected choice. The quiz is
identical across treatments, and is constructed in a way that leaves little chance for answering
it correctly without full understanding of the exact probabilities with which each potential
outcome can occur.
Once subjects nish the quiz, the experimenter checks their answers, and they then
proceed to ll out a survey (to pass time).6 Having completed the survey, they are asked
to make their choice of an item. Their choice is our outcome of interest.7 (After having
made this choice, on the last page of the instructions subjects are asked hypothetical WTP
questions; the 1% vs. 99% uncertainty is resolved; and subjects' comments are solicited.)
This experimental design has a few important features. First, the goods are treated
symmetrically, and the instructions contain no biased language like \keep" or \trade" that
might aect subjects' choices. Second, the coin-ip guarantees that subjects are aware that
their default gift resulted from a random 50-50 draw. It rules out the concern that a good's
assignment as a default gift may be interpreted by subjects as informative, e.g. regarding
the goods' values (a quality signal) or regarding the \right" choice behavior expected by the
experimenter (demand eects). These concerns, which are raised by Plott and Zeiler (2007),
6Subjects who did not answer both quiz questions correctly are informed that they have incorrect answers
and are asked to re-read the instructions and try again. If they again have mistakes, the experimenter goes
over the instructions and quiz with them for a third time, and then asks them to proceed regardless of their
answers. Importantly, we record the number of attempts it took each subject to answer the quiz correctly,
and use it as a measure of how condent we are that a subject formed expectations as intended.
7Notice that we record gift choices before the 1% vs. 99% uncertainty is resolved, hence before subjects
nd out whether they will get their choice or the gift assigned by the coin-ip. This allows us to elicit real-
stake choices from all subjects (rather than from only the fraction of them who happens to end up in the
choice condition). On the other hand, with this design we cannot test whether subjects' choices once they
know which condition they face are consistent with their ex ante choice-expectations. It would be interesting
to test this aspect of the model in the future, for example by modifying the design to record choice only
after the (choice vs. assigned gift) uncertainty is resolved. Notice however that this will require 1=q times
more subjects, where q = 0:01 in one treatment, and q = 0:99 in the other. Finally, notice that while our
current method of eliciting choice could be interpreted as the `strategy method,' it could alternatively be
interpreted as a standard fully-incentivized elicitation of choice between a certain outcome and a lottery.
11cannot arise in our experiment.
Third, our procedure is explained to subjects at the outset, and so they are never surprised
by facing a choice they did not previously realize they might have to make. This feature
is absent in past variations of Knetsch's (1989) original experiment, where subjects are
rst endowed with a good, and only later learn that in fact they can trade it. In other
words, subjects in our experiment explicitly learn at the outset the complete probability
distributions regarding outcomes, and we have no need to speculate|as, e.g., Knetsch and
Wong (2009) do|regarding subjects' expectations. Relatedly, and importantly, we have
direct evidence on expectations in subjects' responses to the quiz.
To summarize, our rst experiment is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst one designed
to answer the question: In the original setup, what is the largest eect that could result from
expectations alone? Hence, rather than demonstrating that KR could potentially explain
some of the eect (as, e.g., Ericson and Fuster (2010) do), we ask how much of the original
eect KR in fact explains.
2.3.2 Solving the Model
We now solve the consumer problem faced by subjects. Assume w.l.g. that a subject's
default gift, as determined by the coin-ip, is c1; the alternative gift is c2. Depending on
experimental treatment, the subject can choose her gift with probability q 2 f0:01;0:99g.
Also assume w.l.g. that m1 (0) = m2 (0) = 0. If the subject expects to keep c1, she can do
so regardless of the envelope draw. Her reference consumption is then c1 regardless of q. If
she indeed chooses to keep c1 when asked for her choice later, her reference coincides with
her actual consumption, and her utility|expected as well as realized|is just m1 (c1), with
no gain-loss terms. On the other hand, if she deviates from her reference consumption and
chooses c2, her utility will be m1 (c1) with probability 1 q and m2 (c2)+m2 (c2) m1 (c1)
with probability q. It is thus straightforward to show that given her expectation to keep c1








In other words, choosing c1 is consistent with a PE as long as (1) holds.
Alternatively, the subject may expect (when answering the quiz) to choose c2 when choice
is elicited later. In that case, she expects to consume c1 with probability 1   q and c2 with
probability q. Given such expectations and following a line of reasoning similar to the one




1 + (1   q + q)
1 + ((1   q) + q)
. (2)
Thus, when (2) holds, choosing c2 is consistent with a PE.
The model's predictions can now be analyzed for any 0  q  1. However, for our
purposes it is sucient to point out the following approximate results.8 For q close to 0,
there is a unique choice consistent with a PE for
m1(c1)
m2(c2) on either side of
1+
1+: if the former
ratio is greater than the latter, a subject will choose c1; if it is smaller, she will choose c2.
As q grows, there is a growing region for
m1(c1)
m2(c2) to the right of
1+
1+ where choosing either c1
or c2 can be consistent with a PE, and for q close to 1 this region stretches all the way to
1+
1+ . It can then be shown|by comparing the expected utility associated with one PE with
that associated with the other|that for q  1 a PPE is only consistent with the subject
choosing c1 if
m1(c1)
m2(c2)  1 and c2 otherwise.
2.3.3 Experiment 1: Predictions
We now summarize the above analysis and compare the predictions of KR with those of the
standard neoclassical model. In the q = 0:01 (Strong Reference) treatment, subjects expect
to consume the default c1 with very high probability. According to KR, choosing c2 would
8The results we state here are only approximately true in the following sense: they are exactly true for
q = 0 and for q = 1, but become only approximations for q in the vicinity of these extreme values. Replacing
these approximations with exact mathematical expressions unnecessarily complicates the presentation while
having negligible eect on the relevant empirical predictions.
13hence involve a relatively large loss term. For example, if  = 1 and  = 3, subjects are
predicted to choose c1 as long as m1 (c1)  1
2m2 (c2). This is a rather weak condition as long
as subjects perceive the two goods to be of roughly comparable value for them.9 Under these
assumptions, according to KR, the coin-ip should aect choice. On the other hand, for the
q = 0:99 (Weak Reference) treatment, half the subjects are expected according to KR to
choose c2|the good that was not assigned to them by the coin-ip. Finally, the standard
model predicts half the subjects to choose c2 regardless of treatment.
To summarize: (i) nding no eect of the coin-ip on choice under either treatment is
consistent with the standard model. Naturally, it is also consistent with KR if m1 (c1) and
m2 (c2) are of very dierent values, if  is close to 1, or if  is suciently small.10 (ii) Finding
the eect for q = 0:01 but not for q = 0:99 is consistent with KR but cannot be explained
by the standard model. (iii) Finding the eect under both treatments would require an
explanation|a theory of attachment or a psychology of coin-assignment|that neither KR
nor the standard model currently provides. It is of course possible that such an explanation
could be combined with either model. In that case, one could refer to the smaller of the
two eects as a baseline, subtract it from both eects, and compare the residuals across
treatments. A comparison in the spirit of (i) and (ii) above could be informative as to
which of the two models seems useful as part of such a combined explanation. For example,
if the eect is larger for q = 0:01 than for q = 0:99, KR might explain some|though not
all|of the eect. (iv) Finally, we are aware of no theory that could explain nding an eect
for q = 0:99 but not for q = 0:01 (or, more generally, nding a larger eect for the former
treatment than for the latter).
9Remember that on average, for half the subjects c1 is the mug and for the other half it is the pen. They
cost roughly the same and, crucially, were chosen to be similar to those used in other endowment eect
experiments (where the endowment of one of them had a large eect on choices). Also remember that for
KR to apply, the goods have to be for nal consumption.
10Notice that since KR is more general than the standard model, and reduces to it e.g. with  = 0, any
\test between the two models" is, eectively, a test regarding the sizes of KR's  and .
143 Experiment 1: Results
102 subjects participated in our rst experiment, which was conducted during September
and October 2009. We rst describe their replies to the quiz questions, and then we analyze
their replies to the choice question.
3.1 Expectations

































Question 2 is identical to question 1 in all but the rst two lines, which in question 2 read:
With 99% probability, the number I wrote down will not turn out the same as the
number in the envelope. In that case:
Of our 102 subjects, 94 subjects (92%) answered question 1 correctly in their rst attempt.
The eight subjects who did not were asked to re-read the instructions and try again. Seven of
them answered the question correctly in their second attempt. The experimenter explained
the instructions and the quiz questions to the one subject who did not, but we have no
evidence that that subject indeed understood the instructions and hence we have no evidence
regarding that subject's expectations. In question 2, 100 subjects (98%) answered correctly
in their rst attempt, and the two subjects who did not also did not answer it correctly in
their second attempt. The experimenter then explained to them the instructions and the
15quiz. Overall, 94 subjects (92%) answered both questions correctly on their rst attempt.
It seems reasonable to assume with condence that these subjects fully understood the
instructions, and formed expectations as intended by the experimental design.11 We present
choice results below both for the entire population and for these 94 subjects separately.
3.2 Choice
Table 1 reports results for our entire population of 102 subjects. Its rows follow the structure
of Table 1 in Plott and Zeiler (2007). Its leftmost column, titled \All," shows that overall,
across the two treatments, subjects' coin-ip aects their choices. The rst row shows that
60 subjects' coin-ips assigned them with a mug and 42 subjects' coin-ips assigned them
with a pen, and the second row shows that of the former, 48 subjects chose a mug as their
gift, while 28 of the latter did so. The respective proportions|80% and 67%|are presented
in the third row. Finally, the bottom row reports the result of a two-sample one-sided test
of equality of proportions. It shows that the dierence (13%) between the proportion of mug
choosers among `coin-mug' vs. `coin-pen' subjects is statistically signicant at the 6% level.
[Table 1 about here.]
The next two columns of Table 1 report results by treatment. They show that the eect of
coin-ip on choice cannot be explained by expectations: the dierence in proportions in the
Strong Reference treatment (8%) is in fact roughly half that in the Weak Reference treatment
(17%). Indeed, the rightmost column shows that while in the Strong Reference treatment
3% less coin-pen subjects chose mug than in the Weak Reference treatment, the dierence
among coin-mug subjects|which according to KR should be negative|is (positive) 12%.
As the bottom row shows, none of these latter dierences is statistically signicant.
Table 2 reports results for the sub-sample of 94 subjects who understood the instructions
on rst reading, formed expectations as intended, and correctly answered the quiz|our
11Notice that psychologically, fully understanding the relevant probabilities may not be equivalent to
forming expectations. However, as is standard in economics, KR dene the latter as the former.
16manipulation check|on rst attempt. Among these subjects the coin-ip seems to have
aected choice more strongly than among the entire population: as seen in the leftmost
column, the dierence in proportions between coin-mug subjects who chose a mug and coin-
pen subjects who chose a mug is 20%, and it is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
However, the next two columns show that, as in Table 1, the dierence in proportions is
not larger in the Strong Reference treatment (17%) than in the Weak Reference treatment
(19%) and hence cannot be explained by expectations. The rightmost column again shows
that while the proportion of mug choosers among coin-pen subjects is larger (8% dierence)
in the Weak Reference treatment than in the Strong Reference treatment|i.e. it is in the
direction predicted by KR|it is also larger (9%) among coin-mug subjects|opposite to
KR's prediction.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.3 Interpretation
Our overall reading of Tables 1 and 2 is that while coin-ip seems to aect subjects' choices,
assignment to treatment does not. While the former cannot be explained by the standard
neoclassical model, combined with the latter it cannot be explained by KR either.12 Our
interpretation of the results from our rst experiment is hence that there might be \psycho-
logical" eects of the coin-ip on choice, or of the coin-ip combined with our experimental
procedures on choice, but we nd no evidence that the eects are driven by the coin-ip's
eect on expectations.13
12KR could explain our ndings if subjects exhibit a level of probability weighting so extreme that they
regard a 1% chance and a 99% chance as roughly equally probable. Naturally, such interpretation would
empty KR from much of its empirical content.
13One technical concern regarding Tables 1 and 2 is related to the fact that, as seen in the Weak Reference
column in either table, twice as many subjects in that treatment were assigned by their coin-ip to the
mug as those assigned to the pen. However, we believe that this unbalance reects natural variation rather
than reecting e.g. that subjects somehow found a way to aect (or to cheat about) their coin-ip. Our
conclusion is based on the following observations. First, the experimenter was always present in the vicinity
of subjects (although, admittedly, not always directly looking). Second, more importantly, when subjects
ip the coin (on the rst page of the instructions), they do not know yet which coin-ip outcome would
174 Experiment 2
4.1 Design and Predictions
Our second experiment is designed as an attempt to disentangle our experimental proce-
dures (including the coin-ip) from expectations. Specically, it is designed to disentangle
procedures from expectations regarding a subject's own outcomes.14
Our second experiment hence essentially replicates our rst experiment, but it expands
the experimental design to a 2  2 design, and in addition to having Strong Reference vs.
Weak Reference treatments, it also turns o (\Group A") and on (\Group B") the link from
these treatments (and from coin-ips) to expectations regarding own outcomes. This is done
by assigning half the subjects (in both the Strong and Weak Reference treatments) into
Group A and the other half into Group B, and by explicitly informing all subjects that while
everybody is asked to read and understand the complete set of instructions (and answer all
quiz questions), much of the instructions will not apply to Group A subjects who, regardless
of their coin-ip, will get to choose their gift with certainty.
Specically, on the second page of the instructions, subjects are told:
Each participant in the room is either in Group A or in Group B. Your group is
indicated at the top left of page 1 of the instructions. ...
assign them to which item. Third, and most importantly, unbalanced coin-ips are only found in the Weak
Reference treatment, where the coin-ip has virtually no eect on subjects' choice set (it could limit their
choice set with only 1% probability) and, according to both the neoclassical model and KR, should have
virtually no eect on outcomes. Reassuringly, in the Strong Reference treatment, where the coin-ip strongly
aects subjects' outcomes (by simply eliminating choice and determining their gift with 99% probability),
the coin-ips came out perfectly balanced.
14In doing so, our second experiment also addresses the following conceptual point. Consider any ex-
periment that compares subjects assigned to an \expectations x regarding own outcomes" treatment with
those assigned to an \expectations y regarding own outcomes" treatment (in our case, Strong Reference vs.
Weak Reference). Such an experiment eectively keeps constant across treatments the very fact of linking
treatments with \expectations regarding own outcomes" (as opposed to linking them with something else).
As a result, rather than testing it, such an experiment eectively assumes that it is this specic form of
expectations|indeed, that it is some form expectations in the rst place|that is crucial in determining the
results.
While being a subtle point, potentially of only limited empirical importance, this point applies more
generally to many other past experiments and is independent of our specic ndings in our rst experiment
above.
18The instructions include sections that are common to all participants, and sections
that apply only to Group A participants or only to Group B participants. ...
We ask that regardless of your group, you carefully read and understand all sections
of the instructions ... without skipping any parts of the text. ... In other words, we
ask you to read and understand the complete set of instructions, but remember that
sections that apply to the other group will not aect you in any way. (It is important
for the study that both groups read the same set of instructions.)
For an example of the full instructions (as well as a photo of the experimental setup) see
Appendix B.15 While the instructions are longer than in our rst experiment, and are more
complicated for subjects to understand, we show below that three quarters of subjects fully
understood them on rst reading and answered all quiz questions correctly on their rst
attempt.
In this 2 fStrong Reference vs. Weak Referenceg  2 fGroup A vs. Group Bg design ex-
periment, the standard neoclassical model still predicts no eect on choice of either the coin-
ip or assignment into one of the four experimental cells. On the other hand, KR (with  suf-
ciently greater than 0,  suciently greater than 1, and m1(c1) suciently close to m2(c2))
predicts that coin-ips should matter in Strong Reference cells more than in Weak Refer-
ence cells, and|crucially for the \expectations regarding own outcomes" interpretation|in
Group B more than in Group A.
4.2 Expectations
Our second experiment was conducted between November 2009 and April 2010 at a large
university in the Northeast. 434 subjects participated. The quiz, which is identical across
15As is clear from reading the instructions and viewing the setup photo, our second experiment diers
from our rst experiment in technical implementation details that are orthogonal to the theories tested.
Such details include location, the exact design of the mug and the pen, the time-ller survey (in the second
experiment it is a one-page \Big Five" personality traits questionnaire (John and Srivastava, 1999) embedded
in the instructions), and that in the second experiment the experimenter ips the coin (in the presence of
the subject; see footnote 13).
19subjects and which all subjects have to fully answer regardless of assignment, consists of four
questions (see Appendix B). In addition to the two quiz questions from Experiment 1, which
in Experiment 2 are questions about Group B subjects, the quiz in Experiment 2 also adds
a question about Group A subjects, and another question to verify that each subject fully
understands which group she is in and hence forms expectations regarding her own outcomes
as intended by the experiment.
Subjects responded to the four questions as follows. 424 subjects (98%) answered the
Group A question correctly on rst attempt, and the other ten answered it correctly on
second attempt. Subjects found the two Group B questions harder to answer, with 345 and
378 of them (79% and 87%), respectively, answering on rst attempt the \1% probability"
and the \99% probability" questions. On second attempt, 63 and 36 additional subjects
answered these two questions correctly, while the reminder 26 and 20 subjects did not.
Finally, 409 subjects (94%) answered correctly on rst attempt the fourth question|which
veries that subjects formed expectations about their own consumption as intended; and of
the reminder 25, eleven answered it correctly on second attempt.
Overall, 326 subjects (75%) answered all four questions correctly on rst attempt. One
can be rather condent that in spite of the complexity of the design, these subjects fully
understood the instructions on rst reading and formed expectations as intended by the
experiment.
4.3 Choice
Tables 3 and 4 present choice results in Experiment 2, by coin-ip and by experimen-
tal condition. Each of the top two panels in each table|titled \Group A" and \Group
B"|has identical structure to Tables 1 and 2. An additional panel at the bottom|titled
\Dierence"|compares results in Group A with those in Group B. In contrast with Tables 1
and 2, which present results from one-sided equality-of-proportions tests, all \Result" rows
in Tables 3 and 4 present results from two-sample two-sided tests, eectively treating results
20in either direction symmetrically.16
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
Our overall summary of Tables 3 and 4 is that in Experiment 2 we nd no strong evidence
that either coin-ip or expectations matter much, among either the entire set of 434 subjects
or among the 326 subjects who fully understood the instructions on rst reading and formed
expectations as intended by the dierent experimental conditions. Moreover, the sign of the
(statistically weak) dierences between conditions often go in a direction opposite to KR's
predictions. While this general conclusion is reected in many of the outcomes reported in
the tables, we highlight below three specic points.
We rst look at the leftmost column in either table. In neither the Group A nor Group B
panels can we reject equality of the proportion of mug choosers among coin-mug vs. coin-pen
subjects. Indeed, in Group B more coin-pen subjects chose mug than coin-mug subjects (the
dierence in proportions is  2% in Table 3 and  7% in Table 4, compared with 2% and 4%,
respectively, in Group A), opposite to KR's prediction.17
Second, focusing on the Strong Reference column, in neither of the panels and in neither
of the tables do more coin-mug subjects choose mug than coin-pen subjects (results vary
more in the Weak Reference column). This result again cannot be explained by a lack of
statistical power; indeed, in each of the two Strong Reference cells in each of the two tables,
16For one-sided tests (in the direction of the results) the reader should divide the reported p-values by
two. Importantly, in interpreting the results one should bear in mind that together, Tables 3 and 4 report
32 p-values. While these p-values are not independent of each other, the probability of getting by chance a
low p-value in any of the tests is substantially higher than that suggested by any individual p-value.
17As seen in the Dierence panel, a two-sided test can almost reject equality of the proportion of mug
choosers among coin-pen subjects between Group A and Group B (62% and 74% in the leftmost column of
Table 4; see also the Strong Reference column). Rejecting the null here would suggest that coin-pen subjects
in Group B|where coin-ip aects expectations regarding own outcomes|are less likely to choose in line
with their coin-ip than Group A subjects|where coin-ip aects expectations regarding the outcomes of
others in the room but not of the subject herself. Such a nding would go in the opposite direction of KR's
prediction (and, naturally, would not be explainable by the standard neoclassical model). Investigating
whether yet-to-be-modeled social comparison eects might be at work here is left for future work. Notice
however that among coin-mug subjects we nd no such result (and remember that among coin-pen subjects
the result is statistically weak).
21the small (and never statistically signicant) dierence in proportions is negative. In Group
B|where the coin-ip aects expectations regarding own outcomes|this negative dierence
in proportions is  7% and  8% (in Tables 3 and 4, respectively), compared with  1% and
 2% in Group A. This, again, is opposite to the direction of KR's prediction.
Finally, the rightmost column in either table shows that the dierence among Group
B subjects between the proportion of mug choosers in the Strong Reference vs. the Weak
Reference treatments is in the direction predicted by KR among coin-mug subjects, but
in the opposite direction among coin-pen subjects. None of these dierences is more than
marginally statistically signicant.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The two experiments reported in this paper replace endowment with expectations and fail
to replicate anything close to Knetsch's (1989) original endowment eect. While our experi-
ments are not the rst to nd a dramatically diminished eect once controlling for potential
confounds in the original experiment, they are the rst to do so while carefully establishing,
and verifying with a quiz, subjects' expectations regarding outcomes. Specically, most of
our subjects show that they know the exact probabilities with which they are likely to leave
the lab owning a mug or a pen. And yet, we nd no evidence that the dierence between
expecting to own an item with 99% probability and expecting to own it with 1% probability
(or even with 0% in Experiment 2) matters.
In other words, our experiments fail to nd a KR-esque link from expectations regard-
ing consumption to choices. One potential explanation why Ericson and Fuster (2010) do
nd evidence for such a link relates to the psychological mechanism that may underlie the
link. Ericson and Fuster mention the possibility of a mechanism running from a subject's
expectations to own an item with high probability to the subject spending time thinking
about the item, which in turn aects the subject's reference point. Consistent with such
22interpretation, they report that compared with subjects who were endowed with a mug and
expected with high probability to be able to trade it later for a pen, subjects who expected
a later trade option with low probability \more strongly agree" that they spent more time
thinking about the mug than about the pen. In the same vein, and consistent with our
ndings, it is certainly possible that in our Experiment 1 subjects spent more time thinking
about the item assigned to them by the coin-ip, regardless of the probability with which the
assignment would aect their choice set. It is also possible that in our Experiment 2 subjects
in both Group A and Group B spent much time thinking about \what could have happened"
or \what happens to others" or \what the universe of possibilities is" or \what should have
happened to me if the experiment were fair" etc. In short, if expectations aect outcomes
due to the time spent thinking about the outcomes, then the implementation details of how
expectations are controlled in each specic experiment might be what drives both our and
others' ndings. In that case, experiments that are viewed as tests of KR could in reality be
testing special cases of \time spent thinking" theories.
A potential concern regarding our design is that a 1%-probability event may be perceived
by subjects as so unlikely to occur that they do not choose carefully or, conversely, may be
perceived as looming much larger than its true probability. While concerns of this nature
indeed serve as motivation for further exploration and replication, we note that none of them
can easily explain our ndings.
While we intuitively believe that expectations regarding outcomes matter for consumer
choices in many contexts, we fail to nd supporting evidence in the context of the endowment
eect. We close the paper by suggesting directions for future research. One such direction
would be to explore the timing of the establishment of expectations. As KR repeatedly
note, their model is silent on what the \recent past" in which expectations were formed or
held is. Another direction would be to gain better understanding of what are the objects
that go into one's vector of consumption utility components (m(c) in either KR or the neo-
classical model, and therefore also m(r) in KR). In the process of disentangling instructions
23about probabilities from expectations regarding own outcomes, our second experiment might
have unintentionally also added a social component, by drawing subjects' attention to the
potential outcomes of others in the room. Future KR-motivated experimental work could
incorporate a social component into the models it tests.
Finally, we believe that future work|both theoretical and experimental|should think
carefully about the source and nature of expectations. While in economists' models ex-
pectations are often equivalent to beliefs about probability distributions, one might wonder
whether expectations exogenously dictated in the lab aect choices in the same way that
naturally occurring expectations do; whether expectations have dierent eects when they
are perceived as, e.g., unfair; or whether (and how) aspirations and expectations interact.
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32Appendix B: Experiment 2 Instruments Example
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42Table 1: Choice by Coin-ip in Experiment 1 (All 102 Subjects)
All
Weak Reference Strong Reference Dierence
(q = 99%) (q = 1%) Weak   Strong
(# coin-mug, (60, 42) (34, 16) (26, 26)
# coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug,
(48, 28) (29, 11) (19, 17) # coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (80%, 67%) (85%, 69%) (73%, 65%) (12%, 3%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di = 13% di = 17% di = 8%
Result p = 0:06 p = 0:09 p = 0:27
p = 0:88,
p = 0:41
Notes: All p-values are from two-sample one-sided tests of equality of proportions.
43Table 2: Choice by Coin-ip in Experiment 1 (Only 94 Subjects Correct on First Attempt)
All Correct
Weak Reference Strong Reference Dierence
(q = 99%) (q = 1%) Weak   Strong
(# coin-mug, (55, 39) (32, 16) (23, 23)
# coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug,
(46, 25) (28, 11) (18, 14) # coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (84%, 64%) (87%, 69%) (78%, 61%) (9%, 8%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di = 20% di = 19% di = 17%
Result p = 0:01 p = 0:06 p = 0:10
p = 0:82,
p = 0:31
Notes: All p-values are from two-sample one-sided tests of equality of proportions.
44Table 3: Choice by Coin-ip in Experiment 2 (All 434 Subjects)
All
Weak Reference Strong Reference Dierence
(q = 99%) (q = 1%) (Weak   Strong)
Group A: Reference applies to some people in the room, but NOT to self
(# coin-mug,
(111, 106) (57, 50) (54, 56) # coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug,
(71, 66) (36, 29) (35, 37) # coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (64%, 62%) (63%, 58%) (65%, 66%) ( 2%,  8%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di = 2% di = 5% di =  1%
Result p = 0:80 p = 0:59 p = 0:89 p = 0:86,
p = 0:39
Group B: Reference applies to some people in the room, INCLUDING self
(# coin-mug,
(115, 102) (54, 54) (61, 48) # coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug, (79, 72) (35, 34) (44, 38)
# coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (69%, 71%) (65%, 63%) (72%, 79%) ( 7%,  16%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di =  2% di = 2% di =  7%
Result p = 0:76 p = 0:84 p = 0:40
p = 0:40,
p = 0:07
Dierence (Group A   Group B)
( 5%,  8%) ( 2%,  5%) ( 7%,  13%)
Result p = 0:45, p = 0:86, p = 0:40,
p = 0:20 p = 0:60 p = 0:14
Notes: All p-values are from two-sample two-sided tests of equality of proportions.
45Table 4: Choice by Coin-ip in Experiment 2 (Only 326 Subjects Correct on First Attempt)
All Correct
Weak Reference Strong Reference Dierence
(q = 99%) (q = 1%) (Weak   Strong)
Group A: Reference applies to some people in the room, but NOT to self
(# coin-mug,
(78, 76) (38, 37) (40, 39) # coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug,
(51, 47) (25, 21) (26, 26) # coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (65%, 62%) (66%, 57%) (65%, 67%) (1%,  10%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di = 4% di = 9% di =  2%
Result p = 0:65 p = 0:42 p = 0:88 p = 0:94,
p = 0:37
Group B: Reference applies to some people in the room, INCLUDING self
(# coin-mug,
(92, 80) (42, 45) (50, 35) # coin-pen)
(# coin-mug who chose mug, (61, 59) (25, 31) (36, 28)
# coin-pen who chose mug)
(% coin-mug who chose mug, (66%, 74%) (60%, 69%) (72%, 80%) ( 12%,  11%)
% coin-pen who chose mug) di =  7% di =  9% di =  8%
Result p = 0:29 p = 0:36 p = 0:40
p = 0:21,
p = 0:26
Dierence (Group A   Group B)
( 1%,  12%) (6%,  12%) ( 7%,  13%)
Result p = 0:90, p = 0:56, p = 0:48,
p = 0:11 p = 0:26 p = 0:20
Notes: All p-values are from two-sample two-sided tests of equality of proportions.
46